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CASE DIGESTS
WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION, 1986 - 1987
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
IN THE MATTER OF: PATSY MCGRA W, 359 S.E.2d 853 (W.
Va. 1987).
Legal Ethics - Elected Officals
In reviewing the state Judicial Hearing Board's recommendation
that a complaint against a Kanawha County magistrate be dismissed,
the Supreme Court of Appeals held that there was not clear and
convincing evidence to support charges that the magistrate deliberately
failed to follow established procedure in refusing to issue a protective
order for the complainant. Instead, the court said that the magistrate
committed only legal error by basing the refusal to issue the order
upon the complainant's oral statement rather than a written complaint
or statement.
As to a charge that the magistrate demonstrated undignified be-
havior toward the complainant, again, the court found a lack of clear
and convincing evidence that the magistrate had the necessary intent
to prejudice the rights of the complainant, and thus did not violate
the judicial code of ethics.
Bruce Stanley
FUTEY v. CITY OF WHEELING, 354 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1986).
Employment - Labor
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the order of a police
civil service commission is not to be reversed at the circuit court level
without a finding by the circuit court that the administrative body
was "clearly wrong" in its findings of fact.
Bruce Stanley
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PRYOR v. GAINER, 351 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1986).
Statutory Construction
This action involves a petition by three widows of circuit court
judges, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, for a
Writ of Mandamus ordering the state auditor to make full payment
of widows' benefits as provided under W. VA. CODE § 51-9-66 and
to prohibit the auditor from reducing intended benefits. The statute
in question provides for a pension benefit equal to forty percent of
the salaries of the judges. The statute, however, restricts the pool of
money available to yearly contributions of all active judges, plus in-
terest. Further, the statute prohibits the use of general revenue funds.
The pool of funds available had decreased, and each widow would
not receive the forty percent as provided by statute. The court held
that the Auditor had the right to raise the legality of the widows'
benefits and proceeded to discuss the issue of whether the auditor
could continue to pay a portion of the widows' benefits from general
revenue appropriations. The court held that where the legislature re-
stricts an expenditure to be made from a special fund, but, contrary
to this restriction appropriates money from general revenues for that
expenditure for several years and the legislature has noticed that such
appropriations are contrary to the law, the restriction of the expen-
diture may be held to have been deleted. Thus, the State Auditor
was required to pay pension benefits in the amount of forty percent
even if it required the use of appropriations other than in the special
fund.
Susan Robinson
W. VA. CHIROPRACTIC SOCIETY INC. v. MERRITT, 358 S.E.2d
432 (W. Va. 1987).
Workers Compensation - Maximum Fees
The Workers' Compensation Board failed to comply with the state
Administrative Procedures Act, which governs rule-making by ad-
ministrative agencies, when it set maximum charges payable to chi-
ropractics in a "Chiropractic Fee Utilization Schedule."
The court rejected the commission's contention that the schedule
did not rise to the level of rule-making. The court noted that the
1987]
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schedule, in addition to setting fees, also regulated the number of
visits and contained a medical review procedure. The court found
that the schedule, by affecting private rights, by involving public pol-
icy, by affecting the availability of chiropractic treatment to injured
workers, and by having the force of law, constituted a rule within
the meaning of the West Virginia Code.
As for the commissioner's contention that the authorizing legis-
lation for establishing the schedule should result in an exemption from
the Administrative Procedures Act, the court noted that there was
no language in the authorizing legislation expressly giving such ex-
emption.
Bruce Stanley
II. BANKRUPTCY
MILLER v. BARRON, 352 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1986).
Personal Exemption
This case involved the question of how the one thousand dollar
personal exemption provided under W. VA. CODE § 38-5A-9 should
be applied to successive suggestee executions filed against the debtor's
wages.
After noting that exemption statutes are to be liberally construed
in favor of the debtor, the court held: (1) The exemption is to be
based on the fair market value of the property on the date the ex-
emption is asserted; (2) the procedure for claiming personal exemption
for wage payment is protected under the W. VA. CODE § 38-8-3,
which applies to personal property existing on the date the personal
exemption is filed; (3) to claim wages as exempt, a successive ex-
emption affidavit must be filed for each pay period; and (4) the
personal exemption covers only the property claimed or selected by
the debtor in the exemption affidavit. Thus, the debtor is not deemed
to have his personal exemption reduced by totaling the prior amount
of wages so exempt.
Susan Robinson
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE
UMWA v. FAERBER, slip op. No. 125-87 (W. Va. June 15, 1987).
Attorney Fees Award
[Vol. 90
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In determining whether state Secretary of Energy Kenneth Faer-
ber, cited for contempt of court, including an award of attorney fees
for the successful prosecution of the contempt motion, could be held
personally liable for the award, the Supreme Court of Appeals held
that while fees could be awarded where the noncomplying party had
acted in bad faith, the commissioner's actions in the present case
were not enough to warrant personal liability as the commissioner
did not "openly defy the court." Citing federal court cases, the court
did imply that personal liability would attach had that been the case.
Bruce Stanley
SHREVE v. WARREN ASSOC., INC., 355 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va.
1987).
Attorney Fees Award
On an appeal of a trial court's award of attorney fees on a motion
for sanctions for failure to comply with discovery under Rule 37 of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court of
Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion in giving
an award that included fees not related to the discovery process. In
addition, on the facts of the case before it, when the trial court failed
to rule on the Rule 37 motion, forcing numerous hearings, the court
held that it is "unjust" to assess the fees incurred in finally obtaining
a ruling. The court also held that the party against whom sanctions
were imposed had meritoriously asked for a postponement for com-
pliance with discovery requests, making an award of sanctions in-
appropriate.
Bruce Stanley
VANMETER v. WARNER, 359 S.E.2d 596 (W. Va. 1987).
Default Judgment - Relief
In this case, the court considered the issue of the necessary re-
quirements for a party to obtain relief from an order or judgment
by an independent action pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Procedure.
19871
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 18
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/18
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Following the requirements it had set forth in a prior decision,
the court held that a party should not obtain relief from a default
judgment by an independent action where: (1) The defendant had
knowledge of the facts which were alleged to make the judgment
inequitable at the time of the suit; (2) the defendant received timely
notice; and (3) no steps were taken to respond until some four years
after the default had occurred.
Susan Robinson
BEGO v. BEGO, 350 S.E.2d 701 (W. Va. 1986).
Pro Se Litigants - Due Process
In pro se settings, the court held that it is necessary for the trial
judge to insure that the self-represented party is not denied an op-
portunity to be heard strictly on the basis of that party's unfamiliarity
with procedural matters. To do otherwise, the court held, is to violate
that party's right to due process. The case at hand was heard before
a special divorce commissioner rather than before a circuit court,
however, the court held that the duty to accommodate the self-rep-
resented party is the same in both forums.
Bruce Stanley
MELLON-STUART CO. v. HALL, 359 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1987).
Sovereign Immunity
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that two firms,
which contracted with the Board of Regents as sophisticated busi-
nesses, are charged with knowledge of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity and that subsequently the court of claims is their only source
of remedy. The court further held that the clerk of the court of claims
is required to recertify those claims in the state budget in the event
the state legislature does not pay them in the year they are initially
certified.
The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to
decisions by the court of claims since the court of claims operates
in a judicial capacity; the parties received a full and fair chance to
litigate the dispute; and applying the principles would be in harmony
[Vol. 90
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with the legislature's policies in creating the court. The decision would
allow the contractors to use the award amounts from the court of
claims as a credit or set-off to any judgment the Board of Regents
might be awarded in its circuit court action against the contractors.
Bruce Stanley
KNOTTS v. MOORE, 350 S.E.2d 9 (W. Va. 1986).
Writ of Prohibition - Res Judicata
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a circuit
court decision to dismiss an appeal of a county commission order
closing a street. The circuit court based its decision not to hear the
appeal on the supreme court's earlier order dismissing a petition seek-
ing prohibition of the county commission order. The circuit court
believed the high court decision constituted a decision on the merits.
The high court held that the dismissal of such a petition does not
have a res judicata effect, but rather, the appellant is entitled to a
hearing on the merits of the county commission order.
Bruce Stanley
IV. COMMERCIAL LAW
ANDERSON v. NICHOLS, 359 S.E.2d 117 (W. Va. 1987).
Contracts - Arbitration
In affirming a circuit court's grant of summary judgment of an
arbitration award, the Supreme Court of Appeals refined its basic
approach to arbitration law. The claim by the defendant that one of
three arbitrators was biased toward the plaintiff was without the merit
necessary to vacate the arbitration order, as it is to be expected that
a party to arbitration, if allowed by the agreement to choose one of
the arbitrators, will choose one with sympathy to his position. In
addition, in the absence of "time is of the essence" language in the
arbitration agreement, the fact that the arbitration award was made
six days later than called for by the agreement is not enough to nullify
the award. The court adopted the rule that prejudgment interest will
be awarded to arbitration judgments if one party elects to take the
judgment into the courts, with the party losing at the trial level being
held responsible for both pre- and post-judgment interest.
19871
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Bruce Stanley
G. M. MCCROSSIN, INC. V. WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF RE-
GENTS, 355 S.E.2d 32 (W. Va. 1987).
Contracts - Sovereign Immunity
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court decision
dismissing a suit against the West Virginia Board of Regents on the
grounds that the Board of Regents has constitutional immunity from
such suits. After McCrossin's claim against the state was disallowed
by the Court of Claims, the company sought relief in circuit court,
claiming breach of contract or, alternatively, seeking reformation of
the contract between McCrossin and the Board of Regents to cure
a mistake the company had made in submitting the low bid on a
construction contract.
The court refused to overrule an earlier case which specifically
recognized sovereign immunity for the Board of Regents. The court
reasoned that allowing such claims would, among other things, threaten
the budget process as claims resulting from a particular project could
deplete budgeted funds prior to the project's completion. In addition,
in cases of contract, where the Board of Regents has presumably
dealt with a sophisticated bargainer, the court found that resort to
the state Court of Claims as the sole recourse available for resolving
such disputes is analogous to having entered into a contract which
provides for binding arbitration.
Bruce Stanley
APPALACHIAN LABORATORIES, INC. v. BOSTIC, 359 S.E.2d
614 (W. Va. 1987).
Contracts - Covenants Not to Compete
In reversing a circuit court ruling on a covenant not to compete
in an employment contract, the Supreme Court of Appeals, while
reemphasizing that such covenants are legal, held that on the facts
before it, this particular covenant was unenforceable as it was un-
reasonable. An employer attempting to enforce the covenant must
show that the interest he seeks to protect is unique or confidential
[Vol. 90
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enough to deserve such protection, that the employer is not simply
attempting to prevent the employee from using his management skills
or public knowledge. While in some instances customer lists might
be worthy of protection, as the customer list compiled by the em-
ployer in the present case was easily ascertainable (coal companies in
southern West Virginia), it was not deserving of protection through
enforcement of the covenant.
Bruce Stanley
LAYA v. ERIN HOMES, INC., 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
Corporations - Piercing the Veil
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that to pierce
the corporate veil in order to .hold a shareholder active in the op-
eration of a business personally liable for breach of contract to a
party who contracted with the corporation, there is a two-prong test:
(1) "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate person-
alities of the corporation and the individual shareholder(s) no longer
exist (a disregard of formalities requirement) and (2) an inequitable
result would occur if the acts are treated as those of the corporation
alone (a fairness requirement)." The court listed numerous items that
would indicate evidence of the disregard of formalities requirement,
among them the commingling of funds and other assets of the cor-
poration with those of the shareholders; diversion of corporate funds
to noncorporate uses; failure to maintain corporate formalities or
adequate corporate records; identical equitable ownership in two en-
tities; and inadequate capitalization. However, while listing such fac-
tors, the court noted that disregarding formalities is not the most
important requirement.
As to the use of a summary judgment in determining the propriety
of an attempt to pierce the corporate veil, the court held that whether
a party should be allowed to attach liability to the individual share-
holders is a question of fact for the trier of fact.
Bruce Stanley
BR YAN v. MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO., No. 153-
19871
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87 (W. Va. July 16, 1987).
Insurance - Tortious Interference
Reversing in part a circuit court's decision to grant summary judg-
ment, the Supreme Court of Appeals found that Massachusetts law,
stipulated to by the contract, would be used for purposes of inter-
pretation. When an insurance agent is terminated under an "at will"
contract, the agent might be entitled to compensation for future earn-
ings from his work. Therefore, more facts are needed to clarify ap-
plication of Massachusetts law, making summary judgment a
premature disposition of the case.
In reviewing the complaint charge of tortious interference with a
business relationship, the high court agreed with the lower court's
finding that as the defendants showed a financial interest in the in-
duced party's business and that their intent was to influence another
party's business policies in which they had an interest, the defendants
met the affirmative defense of privilege. As for the plaintiff's charge
of defamation through a letter sent by the defendant to customers
formerly serviced by the plaintiff, the court agreed that the plaintiff's
claim did not meet the required elements of the tort as the letter was
truthful.
Bruce Stanley
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STATE v. HAMBRICK, 350 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1986).
Search - Consent, Waiver - Intoxication
At issue in this case was what constitutes valid consent to a search
of premises and whether statements made under the influence of al-
cohol were inadmissible for failure of a voluntary, knowing, and in-
telligent waiver of the appellant's constitutional right against self-
incrimination. In resolving the first issue, the court derived a two-
part analysis. First, consent must be freely and voluntarily given and
not a product of duress or coercion as determined from the totality
of the circumstances. Second, the consenting party must possess the
requisite authority or relationship over the premises to be searched.
Existence of the first requirement was not contested in this case. The
[Vol. 90
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court then found that since the consenting party was a co-occupant
of the premises and the evidence was located in a common area in
which the appellant had no expectation of privacy, the requisite au-
thority existed.
Further, the court determined that a statement procured while a
person is intoxicated is not inadmissible per se, unless the degree of
the intoxication is such that the person lacks the capacity to vol-
untarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights.
Susan Robinson
STATE V. DAVIS, 357 S.E.2d 769 (W. Va. 1987).
Arson
The issues in this case were whether: (1) The indictment was prop-
erly indorsed by the jury foreman; (2) the state proved that the de-
fendant willfully and intentionally set a fire; (3) the trial court properly
charged the jury about the elements of criminal intent; (4) it was
error for the lower court to fail to conduct a hearing relative to the
defendant's competency to stand trial; and, (5) it was error to allow
the state to argue a new theory not supported by the evidence during
closing argument. The court held that: (1) The failure to indorse or
attest the indictment on the reverse side is not a fatal defect; (2) to
prove attempted arson, the state need only show a specific intent to
commit the crime and an act toward its completion; (3) reading the
instructions as a whole, it is clear that they were adequate and correct;
(4) the defendant waived his right to a hearing by failing to request
one after receiving notice of the court's determination that he was
competent to stand trial; and (5) the state's argument was not suf-
ficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal.
Patrick Harton
STATE EX. REL. OWENS v. BROWN, 351 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va.
1986).
Change of Venire
The issue in this case was whether the defendant was entitled to
a writ of prohibition preventing the respondents from trying him in
19871
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one county in front of a jury summoned from another county.
The court held that the defendant was entitled to be tried by a
local jury and reaffirmed the longstanding rule that when a change
of venire is proposed by the state or the trial court, W. VA. CODE
§ 52-1-14 must be interpreted to require a "clear and convincing
showing that it is necessary to obtain a fair trial."
Patrick Harton
STATE v. BUCK, 361 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1987).
Disproportionate Sentencing
The issue in this case was whether the thirty year sentence given
the defendant was disproportionate in that his co-defendant received
a one year sentence.
The court upheld the sentence, pointing to evidence that the de-
fendant was the instigator of the crime and used violence in the fur-
therance of the crime as justification for the greater sentence.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. KELLER, 355 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 1987).
Double Jeopardy
The issue in this case was whether the defendant should be granted
a writ of prohibition preventing the state from re-trying him after a
mistrial was declared. The mistrial had been declared because the
defendant's attorney had prejudiced the jury. The court held that the
writ should be granted because the prejudice was slight, the trial court
granted the mistrial in summary fashion without considering any al-
ternatives that might have corrected the defense counsel's error, and
there was no manifest necessity for terminating the trial.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. BRUMFIELD, 358 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 1987).
Escape - Kidnapping
The issue is this case was whether, under W. VA. CoDE § 61-2-
14a, a kidnapping conviction could be upheld when the defendant
[Vol. 90
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locked two correctional officers in a room while attempting to escape
from jail.
The court held that because the kidnapping was incidental to an-
other crime, the conviction could not be upheld. In determining
whether a kidnapping is incidental to another crime, the court will
consider: (1) The length of the time the victim was held and the
distance he was forced to move; (2) the location and environment of
the place the victim was detained; and (3) the exposure of the victim
to an increased risk of harm.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. STEELE, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1987).
Evidence - Witness Sequestration - Battered Women's Syndrome
In a case concerning witness sequestration, the supreme court held
that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to prohibit a witness
to testify if that witness has failed to comply with a sequestration
order. As for the standard of review of the trial judge's decision, the
court maintained a requirement that the decision must have arbitrarily
prejudiced the defendant's rights. The court held that a sequestration
order extends to the listening to recordings of testimony that has come
before the trier of fact. If the party violating the sequestration order
is a witness for the prosecution, on appeal the defendant must prove
that the testimony, if allowed, prejudices the defendant's case.
In defending against a murder charge by claiming battered wom-
en's syndrome, the court held the defendant can offer: (1) Expert
testimony explaining the defendant's condition, and (2) an opinion
as to whether the defendant fits the psychological profile of the con-
dition.
Bruce Stanley
STATE v. COZART, 352 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1986).
Evidence - Breathalyzer Test - Self Incrimination
The issue in this case was whether, in a criminal trial, the ad-
mission into evidence of the defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer
19871
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test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol violated
the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The court held that the defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer
test should be admissible in some instances as evidence of his guilty
conscience or knowledge. However, upon request by either the de-
fendant or prosecution, the trial judge should hold an in-camera hear-
ing to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect. If a decision is made to admit the evidence, a cautionary
instruction should be given. The instruction should explain that this
evidence has only a slight tendency to prove guilt as it does not bear
directly on the issue of guilt.
Patrick Harton
STATE V. MCCALLISTER, 357 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1987).
Evidence - Other Crimes
The issue in this case was whether it was error for the trial judge
to refuse to give a limiting instruction when evidence of another crime
is admitted and the defendant had requested such an instruction.
The court held that in such circumstances, the jury should be told
that the evidence should not be considered proof .of the defendant's
guilt, but may be examined to determine whether a particular element
of the present charge has been proven.
The court held that in this situation fraud did not occur because
the recipient could not be defrauded by representations he knows to
be untrue or could have known to be by exercising ordinary prudence
using means readily at hand.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. STIFF, 351 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1986).
Evidence - Photographic Array
The issue in this case was whether error was committed in the
lower court by admitting into evidence a photographic array used to
identify the defendant.
[Vol. 90
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The court held that although there were discrepancies between the
victim's and arresting officer's recollection of the array, and some
of the men in the array were much older than described by the victim,
the array was still admissible.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. MAYLE, 357 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1987).
Evidence - Juror Threatened - Felony Murder
The main issues in this case were: (1) Whether a court should
declare a mistrial when a juror is threatened; and (2) whether the
felony murder rule applies when the death occurs one-half hour after
the robbery and 2.1 miles away from the scene of the robbery. The
court held that declaring a mistrial because a juror was threatened
would "open the season on juries" and a mistrial should be granted
only when "the juror's impartiality has been so affected that he can
no longer fairly decide the facts." As to the felony murder issue, the
court held that the defendants "were still involved in the chain of
events surrounding the robbery."
Partick Harton
STATE v. ORTH, 359 S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1987).
Fraud - Bad Checks
The issue in this case was whether the defendant could be con-
victed of knowingly writing bad checks when the recipient of the
checks knew of the defendant's tendency to write bad checks and
had an elaborate system for determining if there were sufficient funds
in an individual's account to cover a check. The court held that the
recipient could not be defrauded by representations he knows to be
untrue or could have known to be untrue by exercising ordinary pru-
dence already at hand.
Patrick Harton
MORRISON v. HOLLAND, 352 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1986).
Harmless Error - Shifting Burden of Proof
19871
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 18
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/18
WEST VIRGINIA LAW RE VIEW
In following a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which
found that, where the state has presented a prima facie case, a jury
instruction placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove
reasonable doubt of his guilt when pleading the defense of alibi is
unconstitutional, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals limited
the application of that decision only to cases in litigation or on appeal
where the error has been preserved. As a timely objection was made
in the case at hand, the analysis then shifted to whether, under the
doctrine of harmless constitutional error, the conviction should stand
or whether a writ of habeas corpus should be entered and a new trial
ordered.
The standard for determining whether an instruction on an alibi
that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant has been harmful
is the credibility of the alibi testimony. For the error to be harmless,
the court must find that testimony to have been "incredible."
Bruce Stanley
STATE v. GLOVER, 355 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1987).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Dilligent Investigation
The issue in this case was whether the failure of defense counsel
to contact, subpoena and call alibi witnesses when an alibi defense
was the defendant's only possible defense constitutes ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.
The court held that since the record was inconclusive as to whether
counsel diligently investigated the defense, the case would have to be
remanded for development of the record and a ruling by the trial
court on the point.
Patrick Harton
FACILITY REVIEW PANEL v. HOLDEN, 356 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va.
1987).
Jail Conditions - Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The primary issue in this case was whether jail conditions violated
the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment contained in
the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
[Vol. 90
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III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution. The Court held that
to determine whether or not jail conditions constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment, the jail must be evaluated by a "totality of the
circumstances" test. In the present case, the court found that the
uncontroverted facts showing inadequate food, shelter, clothing, san-
itation, medical care and personal safety constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.
On a secondary issue involving a prisoner's good time credit, the
court held that good time credit is a liberty interest protected by the
due process clause, W. VA. CONST. art. III § 10, and it is mandatory
that the prisoner be granted his credits if he faithfully complies with
all rules and regulations.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. HOLMES, 351 S.E.2d 422 (W. Va. 1987).
Judicial Intervention - Vague Testimony
The issue in this case was whether it is error for a trial judge to
advise the state, sua sponte, to re-call a witness so that the witness
might clarify ambiguous testimony by repeating statements he had
made to the judge in chambers.
The court held that the trial judge's actions were within his right
to control the orderly process of the trial and thus reversible error
was not committed.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. LINKOUS, 355 S.E.2d 410 (W. Va. 1987).
Jury Prejudice - Physical Restraints
The two issues in this case were: (1) Whether a criminal defendant
has a right to be tried free of physical restraints; and, (2) whether
it is reversible error for a trial judge to try a criminal defendant with
a jury panel that may have seen him in handcuffs for a brief period
of time prior to trial.
The court held that: (1) A criminal defendant does have a right,
absent some necessity relating to security or order, to be tried free
19871
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of physical restraints; and, (2) in this case, however, there was no
reversible error where the defendant only initially appeared in hand-
cuffs and was not restrained throughout the trial.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. MCKINNEY, 358 S.E.2d 596 (W. Va. 1987).
Jury Prejudice - Physical Restraints
The issue in this case was whether a prisoner has a right to be
tried free of physical restraints and also whether omission of the word
"felonious" in a felony indictment makes the indictment worthless.
The court held that: (1) A defendant does have a right to be tried
free from physical restraints; and (2) if an indictment clearly indicates
that the charge is a felony, it is valid.
Partick Harton
State ex rel. M.L.N., G.F. & M.L. W. v. Griener, 360 S.E.2d 554
(W. Va. 1987).
Juveniles
The issue in this case was whether youths between the ages of
eighteen and twenty years come within the definition of "child" as
mentioned in W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(A) (1986).
The court held that such individuals who remain under juvenile
court jurisdiction are children within the meaning of W. VA. CODE
49-5-16(A) and must be given the same rehabilitative opportunities
afforded by that section as children under eighteen. Furthermore, they
must be housed in a section of a jail designed exclusively for juveniles
if they are held in county jails.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. REEDY, 352 S.E.2d 158 (W. Va. 1986).
Jury Prejudice - Criminal Trials
The issue in this case was whether error was committed in a re-
cidivist proceeding in which the defendant was seen in prison attire
prior to voir dire of a juror later impaneled.
[Vol. 90
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After reiterating its commitment to construing the West Virginia
recidivist statute in a restrictive fashion to mitigate its harshness, the
court held that a criminal defendant may not be compelled to wear
identifiable prison attire at trial, which encompasses recidivist pro-
ceedings. The court considers this prohibition a constitutional right,
based on the presumption of innocence, and designed to afford sub-
stantive due process protection.
Patrick Harton
KENNEDY v. FRAZIER, 357 S.E.2d 43 (W. Va. 1987).
Plea Agreements
The issue in this case was whether it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial judge to refuse the plea agreement between the prose-
cution and defendant where the probation department's investigation
report contained statements by the defendant that he had been en-
trapped and sexually harassed by a police officer.
The court held that the defendant's guilty plea was a "voluntary
and intelligent choice" among the alternatives available to him, and
thus the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing the plea agree-
ment. In this case, there was a good chance that a jury would have
convicted the defendant and rendered him vulnerable to further sen-
tence enhancement under W. VA. CODE §§ 61-11-18 (1943) and 60A-
4-408 (1971). In such circumstances, a defendant may consent to a
prison sentence and still deny participation in the crime.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. HUMPHREY, 351 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1986).
Presentment Rule - Felony Murder - Witness Credibility
In concluding that the trial court correctly admitted a defendant's
written confession into evidence, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals held that the presentment rule as outlined in the West
Virginia Code and the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not violated when the defendant is held in custody while police seek
physical evidence mentioned in the recorded statement as long as the
delay from the time of the defendant's arrest until the time he was
1987]
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taken before a magistrate did not affect the voluntary nature of the
confession.
The court also held that the trial court correctly rejected the de-
fendant's request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction. Al-
though the defendant had said in his written statement that the shotgun
he had used to attempt a robbery had gone off accidentally, such an
accidental shooting would not remove the case from the felony mur-
der rule to an involuntary manslaughter scenario.
The court held that the trial court correctly refused to declare a
mistrial as requested by the defendant after the trial court had stated
in an in camera hearing that it did not believe a key witness for the
prosecution. While the defendant interpreted the trial court's state-
ment as one going to the competency of the witness, the Supreme
Court of Appeals found that the trial court was within its discretion
in treating the statement as going to the witness's credibility, which
was not "so incredible as to be completely untrustworthy."
Bruce Stanley
STATE v. GOOD, 355 S.E.2d 371 (W. Va. 1987).
Prosecutorial Misconduct
The issue in this case was whether it was improper for the pros-
ecutor to contact a defense witness and threaten to place him at the
scene of the robbery if he testified in a manner which provided an
alibi for the defendant and to agree not to prosecute the witness if
he either took the stand and told the truth or refused to testify.
The court held that the prosecutor's conduct deprived the defen-
dant of due process of law by intimidating his alibi witness. The
conviction was reversed since the defendant had been denied the op-
portunity to present a witness in his behalf.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. COLLINS, 354 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 1987).
Prosecutorial Misconduct
The two issues in this case were: (1) Whether prosecutorial mis-
conduct occurred when the prosecutor, referring to the defendant's
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wife who was also charged with murder, remarked to a number of
witnesses: "We will see you in June when we nail Nanny's hide to
the wall"; and (2) whether the defendant had a valid claim of pros-
ecutorial overmatch.
The court held that: (1) There was no prosecutorial misconduct
absent evidence of bad faith or an attempt to influence the trial; and
(2) because there was no proof in the record of ineffectiveness of
counsel or an indication that counsel was intimidated by the pros-
ecution, prosecutorial overmatch was not proved.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. WILDER, 352 S.E.2d 723 (W. Va. 1986).
Right to Counsel
The issue in this case was whether the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel was violated by the admission of statements
implicating him in subornation of perjury a crime for which he was
not indicted. At his trial for receiving stolen property, the defendant's
own witness testified that prior to trial, the defendant offered him
a sum of money to perjure himself.
The court held that since the defendant had not been indicted for
subornation of perjury, his sixth amendment right to counsel had not
attached. The court placed great emphasis on the fact that the state-
ments were admitted to impeach the defendant and not to prove the
charge in the indictment.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. MCWILLIAMS, 352 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 1986).
Sanity - Burden of Proof
The issue in this case was whether the state failed to prove that
the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime.
The court held that the defendant had established his insanity at
the time of the commission of the crime through extensive expert
testimony, that the state presented no expert testimony in rebuttal,
and that the lay testimony offered by the state was insufficient to
satisfy its burden of proof.
19871
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Patrick Harton
STATE v. MUEGGE, 360 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1987).
Searches by Private Guards
The two issues before the court were: (1) Whether evidence ob-
tained during a search by a private security guard should have been
admitted at trial; and (2) whether the trial court erred when it ad-
mitted into evidence statements made by the defendant on a ques-
tionnaire presented to him by the security guard.
The court held that: (1) When searches are conducted outside the
judicial process they are per se unreasonable. The only exceptions to
this rule are when a search must be made to uncover weapons that
might be used against the officer or to prevent evidence from being
destroyed. (2) The admission into evidence of the questionnaire was
violative of the defendant's right against self-incrimination because
the evidence was obtained after the defendant refused to sign a waiver
of his constitutional rights and asked for permission to contact his
attorney.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. ALLMAN, 352 S.E.2d 116 (W. Va. 1986).
Sexual Assault - Social Companion
The issue in this case was whether the defendant's granddaughter,
a ward placed in his care, was a voluntary social companion within
the meaning of W. VA. CoDE § 61-88-3(a)(1), which requires the state
to show serious injury or use of a deadly weapon in order to prove
first degree sexual assault. In the case of a non-voluntary social com-
panion, the state need only prove the victim was forced to engage
in sexual intercourse to get a conviction in the first degree.
The court held that the statute was intended to cover dating si-
tuations; thus, the victim was not the voluntary social companion of
the defendant within the meaning of the statute. The court refused
to "allow a defendant to take advantage of the fact that he was
appointed in a position of trust over a child to obtain a lesser sentence
when he forcibly raped his ward."
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Patrick Harton
STATE v. DRACHMAN, 358 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1987).
Speedy Trial
In this case, the court considered whether the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial applies when, absent an actual arrest, formal
charges have been brought in an indictment or information.
The court held that in such situations the speedy trial right does
apply, and the length of the delay triggers the inquiry. The four
factors to consider in determining whether there has been an unrea-
sonable delay are: (1) The length of the delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his rights; and (4) prejudice
to the defendant. The conduct of the state must be balanced against
the conduct of the defendant on a case-by-case basis. No single factor
is either necessary or sufficient to support a claim that the defendant
has been denied a speedy trial.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. MULLINS, 355 S.E.2d 24 (W. Va. 1987).
Warrant Arrest
The issue before the court was whether there were such exigent
circumstances to justify arresting the defendant in his home without
a warrant.The court held that a person can only be arrested for felony
in his home without a warrant when the police reasonably believe
that evidence will be destroyed, the accused will flee, or the safety
of others will be jeopardized if he is not arrested immediately. In the
present case, such exigent circumstances were not apparent from the
facts.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. TURLEY, 350 S.E.2d 695 (W. Va. 1986).
Youthful Offender Statute
The issue in this case was whether a trial judge has the authority
and jurisdiction under the Youthful Offender Statute to commit the
19871
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defendant to a youthful offender center when the defendant used a
pistol to commit the crime.
The court held that the trial court did have the authority and
jurisdiction to suspend the sentence and commit the defendant to a
youthful offender center for up to two years.
Patrick Harton
VI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
IN RE: PETITION BY JAMES M. MATHERLY, 345 S.E.2d 603
(W. Va. 1987).
Evidence - DUI Defense
The court held that a driver charged with driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol could not raise as a defense, at an administrative
hearing to revoke his license, either his extreme intoxication or his
extreme emotional distress for his refusal to respond to a request that
he submit to a blood-alcohol test.The court reasoned that, while the
state statute does not address the question of whether a non-response
to a request to submit to such a test is the equivalent of a refusal
to take the test, to not allow such an inference by silence would
effectively gut the statute.
As for the argument that the driver was too intoxicated or too
distressed to understand the officer's request of him, the court refused
to read into the statute that a refusal to take the test be "intelligently,
knowingly and willingly made."
Partick Harton
STATE v. LEVERETTE, 359 S.E.2d 344 (W. Va. 1987).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Habeas Corpus Relief
The defendant, after being convicted of robbery by violence, filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel. The issue was whether, under the facts of this case, the
defendant was entitled to habeas relief.
The court held that the standard for determining whether counsel
is ineffective to the point of prejudicing the defendant is a balancing
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test which compares counsel's performance with the customary degree
of skill and knowledge possessed by attorneys who are reasonably
knowledgeable of criminal law. In the present case, the defendant
was entitled to relief because the evidence clearly indicated that coun-
sel had failed to investigate the case or adequately prepare for trial
and, at trial, was suffering from a mental disability that prevented
him from engaging in the proper practice of law.
Patrick Harton
STATE v. FINLEY, 355 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1987).
Reversible Error - Jury Prejudice
In a defendant's appeal from his criminal conviction and sentence,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trial court
committed reversible error by not questioning individual prospective
jurors either on motion from counsel or sua sponte, out of the hearing
of other prospective jurors, as to whether they had been prejudiced
by statements from one prospective juror during voir dire that the
defendant had been indicted for other crimes.
On a second issue, the court applied the holding of the Supreme
Court of the United States that a trial judge may take into consid-
eration, when sentencing a defendant, the trial judge's own belief
that the defendant committed perjury as a witness. The court em-
phasized, however, that the trial court cannot give a harsher sentence
to punish the defendant for that perjury.
Bruce Stanley
STATE v. BIAS, 352 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1986).
Competency to Stand Trial
Pursuant to W. Va. R. App. P. 13 and W. VA. CODE § 58-5-2
(1967) the following questions were certified to the court:
(1) "Does the trial' court lack jurisdiction to try a criminal de-
fendant who was on three occasions between 1969 and 1973 found
to be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state mental
hospital, by virtue of W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-2, as effective in 1974?"
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(2) Does the court lack jurisdiction to try this defendant, by virtue
of W. VA. CODE 62-3-21 (1959)? (Three Term Rule)
The court held that:
(1) Because the alleged criminal offense occurred prior to the 1979
amendment, W. VA. CODE 26-6A-5 (1974) should be applied. The
1979 amendment did not indicate any legislative intent for retroactive
application; therefore, the defendant may be tried.
(2) Where, in any term, the defendant procures a continuance of
a trial on his own motion after an indictment is returned or otherwise
prevents a trial from being held, that term is not counted toward
discharge under the three term rule.
Patrick Harton
VII. EDUCATION
KEITH D. v. BALL, 350 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1986).
Students - Reinstatement
In an original mandamus action, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals refused to issue a writ on behalf of several expelled school
students seeking reinstatement. The court rejected the students' con-
tention that a handbook rule stating the minimum penalty for making
a bomb threat, clearly labelled as the minimum penalty, was mis-
leading as the maximum penalty of a one year expulsion was im-
plemented.
In stating the test for review of school board decisions on dis-
ciplinary matters, the court limited intervention to "extreme cases."
While denying the writ, however, the court took exception to the
school board's interpretation of the statutory language of "school
year." The court held that the term refers to a 180 day school term
and not a calendar year, gaining the students readmission to school
sooner than the board's decision would have.
Bruce Stanley
COLLINS v. RITCHIE, 351 S.E.2d 416 (W. Va. 1986).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was presented with
the following issues: (1) Whether a county board of education is
required to provide transportation to send children to and from their
residences; and (2) whether the West Virginia State Department of
Highways is required to maintain a road on which children live so
that a school bus could traverse the road.
This court had previously ruled on the first issue and had held
that the board has an obligation to provide transportation and that
this obligation is not abrogated because of the poor condition of a
road on which the children live. Shrewsbury v. Bd. of Education,
265 S.E.2d 767 (W. Va. 1980).
The court further held that the board's responsibilities are the
same whether the child lives on a well-maintained public road or on
a poorly maintained road, whether the road remains private or be-
comes public under W. VA. CODE 17-1-3 (1963). The road in question
was deemed to be public by virtue of the Code. The court ordered
the Department of Highways to increase the level of maintenance on
the road to the point the children could be provided transportation
to and from school.
Susan Robinson
VIII. EMPLOYMENT
NEW v. TAC & C ENERGY, INC., 355 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1987).
Conflict of Laws
On appeal from an order from the Circuit Court of Mingo County
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals addressed for the first time the question of conflict of
laws in the context of an employment contract.
The court, adopting the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 196
(1971), held that absent an agreement between parties, the validity
and rights of a contract for the rendition of services are determined
by the law of the state where the contract is required to be performed
unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties. The court held that West Virginia had
19871
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the more significant connection to the employment relationship. It
based its decision on evidence that: (1) All of the parties are residents
of West Virginia residing in Kentucky only for the duration of the
job, and (2) the contract was made and partially performed in West
Virginia, thus creating strong ties to this state. Therefore, West Vir-
ginia law applies.
Susan Robinson
WIGGINS v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, 357 S.E.2d 745 (W.
Va. 1987).
Discrimination - Administrative Remedies
Where an employee filed a wrongful discharge action in circuit
court claiming discrimination resulted from his refusal to operate min-
ing equipment in violation of safety rules, the circuit court dismissed
the action, stating that the exclusive remedy for the employee was
through administrative channels. The Supreme Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the employee could bring a tort action in circuit
court for compensatory and punitive damages not available at the
administrative level under the anti-discrimination portions of federal
and state mine safety laws. The court re-emphasized an earlier ex-
ception to the common law exclusivity of remedy rule, noting that
the purpose of anti-discrimination provisions is to encourage com-
pliance with safety rules, not to remedy private wrongs.
As for a claim that the employee had not exhausted all of the
administrative processes available to him in that he pursued his claim
under federal and not state provisions, the court ruled that, as the
two processes were nearly identical and as the employee would not
have been granted any additional relief had he pursued the state ad-
ministrative procedure, employees will not be required to pursue such
procedures to their exhaustion.
Bruce Stanley
CURREY v. WEST VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISISON,
360 S.E.2d 387 (W. Va. 1987).
Discrimination - Review Standards
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In an appeal from a Kanawha Circuit Court order reversing a
decision by the West Virginia Human Rights Commission that found
E.I. DuPont deNemours and Co. guilty of sex discrimination, the
court upheld the circuit court's action. The circuit court used the
appropriate standard of review of the evidence presented to the com-
mission. The Supreme Court agreed that a review of the evidence did
not show that DuPont had practiced sex discrimination against the
complainant when it did not award her one of five new positions
created by the company, and that the company's procedure in filling
the positions was constitutionally acceptable.
The West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act requires the cir-
cuit court to reverse an administrative decision when the adminis-
trative agency has prejudiced a party by violating statutory or
constitutional provisions; by exceeding its authority; by using unlaw-
ful procedures; by committing other legal error; by making a finding
clearly wrong in the face of the evidence; or by abusing its discretion.
Bruce Stanley
KERNS v. BUCKLEW, 357 S.E.2d 750 (W. Va. 1987).
Discrimination - Federal Protection - State Immunity
The court held that, in cases of employment discrimination, fed-
eral constitutional protection against such discrimination supercedes
the state's constitutional governmental immunity, as the West Virginia
Human Rights Act is the federal/state cooperative effort to enforce
the fourteenth amendment at the local level.
Upon a writ of mandamus sought by a woman denied employment
by West Virginia University and the West Virginia Board of Regents,
the court ordered that the University and Regents pay the damages
awarded by the West Virginia Human Rights Commission, including
an award of back pay even though the complainant had never been
hired. The court said the back pay award cannot be challenged by
a party that practiced discrimination, and that such discrimination
prevents the party from denying an employee/employer relationship.
Bruce Stanley
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CONAWAY v. EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORP., slip op.
No. 16969 (W. Va. December 9, 1986).
Discrimination - Test for Claims - Statute of Limitations
Affirming the circuit court's granting of summary judgment for
the defendant against the plaintiff's claims of age discrimination,
wrongful discharge and breach of contract, the Supreme Court of
Appeals adopted as a test for proving claims of age discrimination
that: (1) The plaintiff be a member of a protected class; (2) the em-
ployer's decision have an adverse effect on the plaintiff; and (3) that
the defendant would not have made the decision if the plaintiff were
not a member of the protected class. To meet the third element, the
plaintiff is required to show evidence giving rise to an inference that
the employer acted discriminatorily. The employer would then have
to show that the action was not discriminatory. The plaintiff would
then have a chance to rebut the defendant employer's claimed reason.
Thus, the court, while not overruling them, limited the application
of previous discrimination tests it had adopted to specific fact si-
tuations like those where they were initially applied.
The court also held, on the issue of wrongful discharge, that while
the plaintiff had started the age discrimination claim before the West
Virginia Human Rights Commission, saving that claim from the stat-
ute of limitations, that action did not preserve the wrongful discharge
claim from the tolling of the statute. In addition, despite previous
treatment by the court of an employee handbook as a unilateral con-
tract, the plaintiff presented no factual evidence to show that such
a contract had been breached, thus failing to save it from summary
judgment.
Bruce Stanley
DILLON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE COUNTY OF
WYOMING, 351 S.E.2d 58 (W. Va. 1986).
Education - Seniority - Board Discretion
When a county board of education exercises discretion in matters
concerning employment, it must exercise that discretion reasonably.
In the event that a board of education abuses its discretion, man-
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damus lies with the courts to correct the abuse. Thus, when a county
board of education did not consider seniority in filling a vacant teach-
ing position with one of two otherwise equally qualified persons, the
court found that the board did not conform to the legislative intent
behind the statute governing such situations. By accepting a super-
intendent's uninvestigated recommendation that one applicant was
more qualified than the other, the board failed to follow its own
procedure requiring the investigation and evaluation of the two can-
didates' qualifications.
The court, finding that the board acted arbitrarily in exercising
its discretion to fill a vacant teaching position, held that the circuit
court was to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the board to repost
the position and to fill it with a candidate chosen from a selection
process that follows established procedure.
Bruce Stanley
MAYNARD V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE COUNTY OF
WAYNE, 357 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1987).
Education - Immunity - Contracts - Laches
In responding to two certified questions from the circuit court
level, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that: (1) Governmental
immunity from contractual liability available to the state Superinten-
dent of Schools and the state Board of Education does not extend
to county boards of education even when those counties have fol-
lowed the directives and instructions of the state officials, and (2)
that it is the written contract between the county school board and
school system employee that determines the applicable statute of lim-
itations when fixing liability in contractual questions, not the statutory
law incorporated into the contract. As a result, the ten year statute
of limitations that applies to written contracts controls, not the two
year statute of limitations that applies to violations of statutes.
The court also addressed the question of laches, holding that it
is incumbent upon the party challenging the legality of a decision
affecting the public interest to act diligently in bringing the challenge.
Otherwise, the challenging party is barred from relief through the
equitable defense of laches, as allowing that party to bring an action
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so long after events leading to the challenge had transpired (nine
years) would result in an inequity. Thus a suit in equity can fail for
laches even though the legal statute of limitations has not expired.
Bruce Stanley
WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF HUMAN SER VICES V. BOLEY, 358
S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1987).
Education - Teacher Discipline
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit
court decision that a public school teacher is not subject to removal
under the West Virginia child neglect and child abuse statute for
alleged incidents of abuse in the classroom. The court noted that there
is statutory language providing specific removal procedures in cases
requiring teacher discipline, and that traditional approaches to stat-
utory construction give specific statutes precedence over general ones.
Bruce Stanley
COURTNEY v. RUTLEDGE, 351 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1986).
Misconduct - Prior Written Warning
In reversing an administrative law judge's finding of gross mis-
conduct by the plaintiff, a finding later upheld by the Board of Re-
view and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals found nothing in the record to show that
the plaintiff had been given prior written warning that his acts might
result in termination of his employment. As such, prior written warn-
ing is required as a matter of law for a determination of gross mis-
conduct, and as incorrect findings of law or plainly wrong findings
of fact are subject to be set aside by the courts, the high court reversed
the circuit court affirmation, replacing it with a finding of simple
misconduct that will result in only a six week disqualification from
unemployment benefits.
Bruce Stanley
MCCLUNG v. MARION COUNTY COMM'N, 360 S.E.2d 221 (W.
Va. 1987).
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Retaliatory Discharge - Punitive Damages - Sufficiency of Evidence
The primary substantive issue before the court speaks to liability
for retaliatory discharge where it is claimed that such discharge re-
sulted from a public employee's exercise of constitutional and stat-
utory rights.
Second, the court considered the question of whether punitive
damages and reasonable attorney's fees should be awarded in a suit
for retaliatory discharge. Procedurally, the court discussed whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor
of the employee for retaliatory discharge.
The court, recognizing that a public employee may not be dis-
charged for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right unless
a substantial governmental interest outweighs the individual's interest
in exercising such right, held that an individual's right to bring an
action for overtime wages outweighs the government's interest in pro-
moting efficiency in public service.
On the second issue, the court held that where the defendant in
a retaliatory discharge case acted wantonly, wilfully, or maliciously,
punitive damages may be recovered. Whether such motive was present
is left within the province of the fact finder. Similarly, a finding that
there was sufficient evidence of bad faith, vexations, wanton or op-
pressive conduct will support an award of reasonable attorney's fees.
The court applied prior tests for examining the sufficiency of ev-
idence to support a jury verdict and found that the evidence was
sufficient in this case. Furthermore, the court held that judgment not
withstanding the verdict should not be granted where the jury could
have properly found for either party upon the factual issues.
Susan Robinson
PEERY v. RUTLEDGE, 355 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1987).
Unemployment Compensation - Misconduct
In reversing a circuit court ruling disqualifying a claimant from
unemployment compensation because the claimant had refused to un-
dertake what he believed to be an unsafe risk, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that disqualification provisions found
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in the Unemployment Compensation Law are to be construed nar-
rowly. As a result, the claimant is not guilty of the disqualifying act
("misconduct") so long as the claimant acted reasonably and in good
faith.
The court held that it is the employer's burden to show that the
work rule job assignment which the claimant violated was reasonable
in nature, with the burden of proof for showing reasonableness for
his acts falling to the employee. That the claimant knew there were
risks when he accepted employment does not mean that by accepting
the claimant had waived his right to make his burden of proof.
Bruce Stanley
PACK v. VAN METER, 354 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1986).
Workers' Compensation
The plaintiff, Pack, an employee of Nelson's Dress Shop, was
injured on the premises after a fall and subsequently sued the building
owner, Van Meter. Van Meter filed a third-party action against Nel-
son's, citing an indemnity clause in the lease with the dress shop.
Among the issues facing the court were whether a building owner
can be liable to his tenant's employee; whether, when a safety statute
has been violated, a defendant can raise assumption of risk as an
affirmative defense; and whether an offset can be had for compen-
sation from the Worker's Compensation Fund.
On the issue of liability of the owner to the employee, the court
adopted the position that the employee can bring suit against the
building owner, citing the shared responsibility between landlord and
tenant for the safety problem (no handrail and unsafe tread on stair-
well) and landlord-tenant law that holds the landlord responsible for
"common use" situations or where the landlord "knew or should
have known" of the defect.
As to whether the defendant landlord should be able to raise an
assumption of risk defense, the court adopted the test that, when
violation of a safety statute is involved, the defense becomes available
only when he can prove that the employee had an alternative which
the defendant voluntarily chose not to exercise, thus acting with
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"willful, wanton or reckless disregard for his own safety." The court
held, that in the fact pattern before it, the defense was not available
to the defendant.
On the question of remittitur of Workers' Compensation benefits,
the court held that, as with all collateral source income, the infor-
mation was inadmissible.
Bruce Stanley
IX. EVIDENCE
STATE v. BANJOMAN, 359 S.E.2d 331 (W. Va. 1987).
Criminal Procedure - Character Witness - Acts of Misconduct
When cross-examining a defendant's character witness about that
witness' knowledge of specific acts of misconduct by the defendant,
the prosecution must disclose the specific questions in an in-camera
hearing. The prosecution must present the court with documents or
witnesses, upon which the court must find a good faith basis in fact
that the misconduct did occur. The prosecution must also limit its
questions about the misconduct to facts about the defendant's char-
acter put in issue on direct examination, and the court must determine
whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
value.
Once the court allows the questioning, the jury should be informed
that the questions go to the credibility of the character witness and
not to the defendant's guilt on the present charge. The court found
the trial court acted correctly in allowing the prosecution to question
a character witness about an incident involving the defendant where
the defendant attempted to obtain money from her insurance com-
pany by telling them that her property had been stolen. The court
said the questions went to the credibility of the witness' testimony
as to the defendant's honesty. However, the trial court committed
error in admitting testimony as to an incident of child abuse involving
the defendant. However, that error was harmless as the remaining
evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the evidence did not have a prejudicial effect upon
the jury.
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Bruce Stanley
STATE v. SMITH, 358 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1987).
Hearsay - Excited Utterance
In considering an appeal challenging a trial court's admission of
hearsay evidence, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that when a
witness testifies as to an excited utterance by a third party that wit-
ness' presence at the event where the utterance occurred is not a
necessary requirement for admissibility.
The requirements for admissibility of hearsay evidence under the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence include: (1) Whether the statement
is trustworthy; (2) whether it is offered to prove a material fact, (3)
whether it is the most probative evidence available to the offering
party; (4) whether the statement is within the general purpose of the
Rules of Evidence; and (5) whether the contesting party has been
given proper notice to prepare to meet the statement.
The court reaffmned its position that, under the Rules of Evi-
dence, a party, in attempting to rebut evidence to which a sound
objection has been registered, has not waived his original objection
to the admission of the evidence.
Bruce Stanley
VENTURA v. WINEGARDNER, 357 S.E.2d 764 (W. Va. 1987).
Reversible Error - Instructions - Similar Incidents - Expert Testimony
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a Mon-
ongalia County Circuit Court decision in a negligence case for re-
fusing to give a defendant's instruction on assumption of risk where
there was evidence to support such a theory of the case. The court
also found error where the trial court would not allow the defendant
to put on evidence of no prior occurrences of similar incidents of
the type that formed the basis of the complaint. The court noted,
though, the weak nature of such evidence and that such error, in and
of itself, does not constitute reversible error.
In an issue concerning expert testimony, the court found error
with the admission of witness testimony on behalf of the plaintiff.
[Vol. 90
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The witness, qualified as a vocational expert, testified as to the ex-
pected playing life span and salary levels of professional tennis play-
ers. The opinion testimony as to salary was based on figures from
Tennis Week Magazine, which was not shown to be an authoritative
source for expert testimony.
Bruce Stanley
X. FAMILY LAW
WOOTEN v. WALLACE, 351 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1986).
Adoption - Duress
In this case, the court addressed the issue of whether the adoption
in question was a product of duress, which statutory law (W. VA.
CODE § 48-4-1(a)) requires the adoption to be set aside.
In reviewing this case, the court held that "duress" in a general
sense existed. The consenting mother was divorced, untrained, emo-
tionally upset, and unable to provide support for herself or her child.
However, the court held that mere "duress of circumstances" does
not constitute duress under West Virginia statutory law. The statute
is to be construed narrowly as contemplating duress created or con-
trived by the adopting parents.
Susan Robinson
BUTCHER v. BUTCHER, 357 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 1987).
Alimony and Child Support
At issue in this case was whether military nondisability retirement
benefits are subject to alimony and child support payments under W.
VA. CODE § 48-2-15(i) and whether they are considered marital prop-
erty subject to distribution. Also at issue was the propriety of re-
habilitative alimony in this case.
After a lengthy discussion of the prior history of the treatment
of military pensions in this context, the court concluded that military
nondisability retirement benefits are subject to alimony and support
payments and are marital property subject to equitable distribution.
In calculating the nonmilitary spouse's share, the court adopted a
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"coverture factor" approach. The factor, applied once the initial mar-
ital share is determined, consists of the ratio of the number of years
the parties have been married while the spouse has been in the military
to the total number of years served by that person in the military.
The amount of marital assets is to be determined and divided ac-
cording to equitable distribution principles prior to determining the
need for alimony and support. This is because such need may be
affected should the spouse receive income-producing property.
In discussing the second issue, the court followed previously es-
tablished guidelines. Noting the advanced age of the wife, her lack
of particular skills, and her qualification for only minimum wage
type of employment, the court found the award of six months re-
habilitative alimony unrealistic.
Susan Robinson
GOLF v. GOLF, 356 S.E.2d 496 (W. Va. 1987).
Alimony and Child Support
On assignment of error, the court entertained the following ques-
tions: (1) Whether allowing credits against accrued support obligations
is proper; (2) whether the circuit court erred in terminating monthly
alimony payments; and (3) whether interest should be allowed on
support payments in arrears.
Finding that the authority of the courts to modify alimony and
child support payments is, absent a showing of fraud in obtaining
award, prospective only, the court held that the power to modify or
cancel accrued arrearage does not exist.
The court also found that a modification should only be granted
upon a showing of a "substantial change of circumstances." Thus,
a termination of alimony payments where the economic position of
the parties had not changed substantially was improper.
The court determined that matured alimony payments were judg-
ment decrees, which like other judgments for the payment of money,
should bear interest from the due date of the payments.
Susan Robinson
[Vol. 90
37
Harton et al.: West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Decision, 1986-1987
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
CASE DIGEST
LAMBERT v. MILLER, 358 S.E.2d 785 (W. Va. 1987).
Alimony and Child Support
In this child support case, the court considered the issue of whether
a "substantial change of circumstances," not within the contempla-
tion of the parties at the time a support order is entered, has occurred
where, following the original order, one party voluntarily assumes
custody of one child and agrees to continue support of the other.
The court also considered the effect of remarriage of the paying spouse
in the context of a request for modification of a child support order.
The court identified several factors to consider in determining if
a substantial change has occurred. These factors are: (1) Change of
financial resources on the part of the obligated parent; (2) the needs
of the child; (3) the motivation for the reduction request; and (4)
whether the change is to be temporary or permanent.
The court held that when the father obtained custody of his child
and entered into an agreed order to support the child, the change in
circumstances created as a consequence of custody should have been
within the contemplation of the parties at that time.
With regard to the second issue, the court held that remarriage
is a factor to consider in weighing the equities of the situation, but
remarriage alone does not justify a modification of a child support
order. Further, the court held that the starting of a second family
and acquiring custody of one child does not constitute a "substantial
change of circumstances" justifying a modification of the agreement
for the support of the other child.
Susan Robinson
STATE EX REL W. VA. DEP'T OF HUMAN SER V. v. CHER YL
M., 365 S.E.2d 181 (W. Va. 1987).
Child Custody
In this case, the court examined the issue of a natural parent's
right to the custody of his or her child.
The court found that a mother, absent compelling circumstances
to justify a denial, is entitled to a meaningful improvement period
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in which to demonstrate her ability to care for her child before her
parental rights may be terminated. Based upon the facts that the
mother in this case was unjustifiably denied an improvement period,
that the Department of Human Services did not provide a family case
plan to the court or did not in good faith render assistance to the
mother, and that the evidence was not clear and convincing, the court
reversed the decision to terminate the parental rights of the mother.
Although the child had resided with foster parents for three years,
it was determined that the paramount consideration of what is in the
best interest of the child was not applicable since the mother did not
voluntarily consent to relinquishment of her parental rights.
Dissenting opinion filed by Justice Neely.
Susan Robinson
STATE v. STEELE, slip op. No. 16804 (W. Va. May 15, 1987), pet.
reh'g denied (July 16, 1987).
Evidence - Witness Sequestrations and Tape Recordings
This case involves the following issues: (1) Whether a witness se-
questration order prohibits prospective witnesses from listening to tape
recordings of prior testimony of other witnesses; (2) whether a con-
viction should be overturned when a witness violates a sequestration
order and is subsequently permitted to testify; (3) whether testimony
should be permitted on the battered women's syndrome; and (4)
whether evidence concerning prior acts of violence on the part of the
victim should be inadmissible.
On the first issue, the court held that the West Virginia seques-
tration rule prohibits prospective witnesses from listening to me-
chanical recordings of the prior testimony of other witnesses.
On the second issue, the court held that it is within the discretion
of the trial judge to determine whether a witness who violates a se-
questration order should be permitted to testify. Further, only where
the trial court acts arbitrarily to the prejudice of the defendant's rights
is a reversal warranted. The court noted that in cases where the wit-
ness's testimony is unrelated to the taped testimony or is related mainly
to collateral matters, no prejudice would result.
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In reviewing the other issues, the court held that in appropriate
cases, evidence regarding the battered women's syndrome may be
introduced. Further, the court held that prior acts of violence on the
part of the victim must first be known to the defendant before tes-
timony regarding such acts is admissible. Also, where such acts are
remote in time, it is within the sound discretion of the judge to ex-
clude testimony of such acts.
Susan Robinson
IN RE: DAVID ANDREW NEARHOOF, 359 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va.
1987).
Grandparents' Rights
Upon certified question from the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County, the court considered whether a grandparent's right to visit
with the grandchild of his deceased child continues when the child
is adopted out of the grandparent's family.
In resolving this issue, the court sought to reconcile the conflicting
provisions of two statutes. W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 provides for
grandparent visitation upon petition by a parent of a deceased child,
and W. VA. CODE § 48-4-11(a) provides for termination of all re-
lationships between the child and his natural parents and lineal or
collateral kindred. The court found that the objective of both statutes
is to provide substitute parentage for the child. Therefore, it con-
cluded that even if a child has been adopted by the spouse of the
child's natural parent, a grandparent shall have reasonable and sea-
sonable visitation rights with the grandchild, provided such visitation
is in the best interest of the child.
Susan Robinson
STATE EX REL M.L.N. v. GREINER, slip op. No. 17536 (W. Va.
1987).
Juvenile Law - Continuing Jurisdiction
At issue before the court in this case was whether the legislature
has conferred upon judges statutory authority to incarcerate persons
between the ages of eighteen and twenty and under continuing ju-
venile jurisdiction in county jails with adult prisoners.
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In recognizing that the state's interest in taking custody of delin-
quents is rehabilitation and that the nature of such custody must
conform to such rehabilitative purpose, the court found that the leg-
islative intent was to prohibit the jailing of youths who are under
continuing juvenile jurisdiction within the sight and sound of adult
prisoners. As a result, such persons can be held in county jails only
if they are specially housed beyond the sight and sound of the adult
prisoners.
Susan Robinson
NANCY R. v. RANDOLPH W., 356 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1987).
Termination of Parental Rights
In this case, the court examined the termination of parental rights
and questioned whether the evidence presented to the trial court was
sufficient to support its finding that Randolph W. was a fit parent.
Randolph W. was indicted for the murder of his wife, the child's
mother. The child's maternal aunt, Nancy R., petitioned the court
for custody. The trial court ruled that the father was a fit parent
and therefore entitled to designate a guardian for the child. As a
result of Randolph W.'s conviction for first degree murder, Nancy
R. sought a reconsideration of the custody order. During the recon-
sideration hearing, the trial court was requested to incorporate records
of the criminal action into the record of the custody proceeding. The
court declined.
The court concluded that the record of the criminal proceeding
should have been admitted into evidence in the custody proceeding
or should have received judicial notice. Further, such a conviction
and subsequent prolonged incarceration are significant factors to be
considered in ascertaining parental fitness and, ultimately, the ter-
mination of parental rights. Accordingly, the court committed the
child to the permanent guardianship of the West Virginia Department
of Human Services.
Susan Robinson
XI. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
CHILD PROTECTION GROUP v. CLINIC, 350 S.E.2d 541 (W.
Va. 1986).
Medical Records
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The court addressed the question of whether the Freedom of In-
formation Act requires disclosure of a school bus driver's medical
records that are in the possession of the school board to parents of
children who ride his bus.
In determining if these records, which fall under W. VA. CODE
§ 29B-1-4(2) (1980), are exempt from public disclosure, the court held
that the public's need to know must be balanced against the indi-
vidual's right to privacy. As to whether disclosure constitutes an un-
reasonable invasion of privacy, the court adopted a five part test: (1)
The court must determine if disclosure would result in a substantial
invasion of privacy and, if so, how serious; (2) the court looks to
the extent or value of the public interest and the purpose for which
such information is sought; (3) the court considers whether the in-
formation is available from alternative sources; (4) the court considers
whether the information was given with an exception of confiden-
tiality; and (5) the court asks whether invasion of privacy can be
minimized in granting the relief requested.
Susan Robinson
DAILY GAZETTE CO. v. WEST VIRGINIA BD. OF MEDICINE,
350 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1986).
Medical Practice
The issue in this case was whether certain sections of the West
Virginia Medical Practice Act, which generally provide that the re-
ports and records of the West Virginia Board of Medicine and its
peer review committees are strictly confidential and immune from
public discovery, are unconstitutional.
The court held that under W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14(o) (1986), if
the Board finds the preliminary existence of probable cause to sub-
stantiate charges of disciplinary disqualification, all information from
such proceedings is open to the public. Also, where the complaint
has been dismissed for failure to find probable cause, the court held
that the complaint or other document setting forth the charges, find-
ings of fact, and conclusions of law supporting the dismissal are ac-
cessible to the public. Furthermore, the court held that information
relating to hospital peer review proceedings is open to the public once
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the information is brought before- the Board following a finding of
probable cause to substantiate the charges.
Susan Robinson
DAILY GAZETTF CO. v. WITIROW, 350 S.E.2d. 738 (W. Va.
1986).-
Elected Officials
Several issues were before the court in the present case. Primarily,
the court entertained the issue of whether release of' settlement doc-
uments relating to the conduct of the public's business in the pos-
session of a public body's attorney or insurer's attorney are "public
records'." The court also questioned whether a public official has a
duty to create and maintain a record of settlement of litigation against
public officials or employees in their official capacity and whether
the prevailing party can. recover attorney's fees in an action brought
under the State Freedom of Information Act.
In resolving the first issue, the court, interpreting the language of
29-B-1-I et seq., held that the disclosure procedures contained in the
State's Freedom of Information Act are to be liberally construed and
that the term "public record" includes within its definition a writing
containing information "relating to the conduct of the public's busi-
ness ...." Thus, a release or other settlement document involving
a public party acting within his official capacity is. a public record.
Furthermore, for the purpose of the Act, a writing is "retained" if
it is subject to the control of the public body. The court also noted
that an agreement of confidentiality is void to the extent that it con-
flicts with the definition of a "public record" under the State's Free-
dom of Information Act.
On the latter issue, the court held that it is the common law duty
of a public official to create and maintain such information for public
inspection and copying. Finally, the court ruled that for the prevailing
party to recover reasonable attorney's fees under the State's Freedom
of Information Act, the evidence must show bad faith, vexatious,
wanton, or oppressive conduct on the part of the public record(s)
custodian.
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Susan Robinson
XII. INSURANCE
JONES v. MOTORISTS MUTUAL INS. CO., 356 S.E.2d 634 (W.
Va. 1987).
Automobile - Named Driver Exclusion
In this case, the court addressed the issue of whether a "named
driver exclusion" clause in an automobile liability insurance policy
is valid in West Virginia.
The plaintiff received an automobile liability policy from the de-
fendant and agreed to exclude her son from coverage while he op-
erated the vehicle. While the son was operating the vehicle, an accident
occurred which caused damage to the insured's automobile and prop-
erty damage to third parties. The insured filed suit claiming damages
arising out of the incident.
The court noted that West Virginia requires that insurance policies
provide a mandatory coverage for third-party liability purposes where
the operator of the car was a permissive user.
As a result, the court held that, where the driver was a permissive
user, insurer must defend actions and/or pay claims for third-party
property damage or personal injury, up to the statutory limits, even
if the operator is specifically excluded from coverage. The court fur-
ther held, however, that the issue of insurance for the insured's own
property is a matter left to the agreement, and, as such, the exclusion
is effective to bar a claim made by the insured for damage to her
or her son's personal property.
Susan Robinson
NATIONAL MUTUAL INS. CO. v. MCMAHON & SONS, INC.,
356 S.E.2d 488 (W. Va. 1987).
Automobile - Exclusionary Clause
The primary issue addressed by the court in this case was whether
a "care, custody and control" exclusionary clause operated so as to
relieve the insurer of any liability to the plaintiffs. Further, the court
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considered whether the insurer should be estopped from denying cov-
erage where it undertook to defend an action arising out of the in-
cident.
The court noted that the circuit court issued its ruling of a de-
claratory judgment in favor of the insurer with sparse factual de-
velopment. The decision was reversed and remanded for further factual
development and a ruling consistent with the guidelines provided by
the court.
In determining whether the exclusionary clause should apply in
this case, the court adopted a multi-factor test. The court will ex-
amine: (1) The nature of the property; (2) the characteristics of the
property; and (3) the insured's relationship to the property. The last
factor includes the insured's duties regarding the property, the nature
and extent of the insured's control, and any interest with respect to
the property the insured may have. Additionally, to determine the
applicability of the exclusion, the court must consider whether the
insured had a reasonable expectation of coverage under the general
liability policy.
In addressing the subsidiary issue, the court adopted a general
rule that an insurer which knowingly and unconditionally defends an
action brought against its insured may waive policy terms and be
estopped to assert those grounds, if detrimental reliance exists. The
court created a presumption that prejudice results where an insured
shows that his insurer has defended an action. This presumption is
rebuttable by evidence showing no actual prejudice and that the in-
sured did not relinquish his right to conduct his defense.
Susan Robinson
PERKINS v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INS. CO., 350 S.E.2d
711 (W. Va. 1986).
Statutory Construction
On certified question from the United States District Court, the
court entertained the issues of: (1) Whether the substantive law of
a foreign jurisdiction should be applied to an action brought in this
state for recovery of damages for personal injury or wrongful death
[Vol. 90
45
Harton et al.: West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Decision, 1986-1987
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
CASE DIGEST
caused in the foreign jurisdiction; and (2) whether West Virginia pub-
lic policy or legal doctrine exists to bar a claim under an uninsured
motorist endorsement. The applicable foreign law does not require
physical contact to establish liability while the insurance policy and
the law of West Virginia requires physical contact.
The court followed the traditional principle that, in tort cases,
the law of the place of wrong is applicable, and it held that the law
of the foreign jurisdiction should be applied in this case.
The insurance company argued, in this instance, that even if li-
ability is established under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction, West
Virginia law should govern the claim under the contract itself. The
court construed W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(g) (Supp. 1986), which de-
clares that an endorsement can require nothing more than the es-
tablishment of legal liability, and found that no public policy of West
Virginia requires that the physical contact requirement be met when
the law of the place of the tort does not have such a requirement.
Susan Robinson
XIII. ETHICS
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS v. WALKER, 358 S.E.2d 234
(W. Va. 1987).
Burden of Proof
Upon the recommendation of the West Virginia State Bar's Com-
mittee on Legal Ethics that the respondent's license to practice law
be annulled, the court addressed three basic issues: (1) Whether the
committee met its burden of proof; (2) whether the existence of emo-
tional problems operates as a defense to ethics violations; and (3)
whether the recommended disciplinary action is appropriate.
The facts disclosed that the respondent staged a breaking and
entering, knowingly gave false reports to the law officials, and im-
plicated an innocent person in connection with the breaking and en-
tering. Further, the respondent set fire to his own home, tendered
bad checks, and threatened physical violence to two individuals. These
events were not denied; rather, the respondent asserted that he was
having financial, marital, and emotional problems.
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Based on this evidence, the court held that the Committee met
its burden of proving the charges by "full, preponderating and clear"
evidence as required in West Virginia to annul the license to practice
law. In discussing the impact of emotional problems on ethical viol-
ations, the court determined that while emotional problems are not
to be recognized as a complete defense, they may be considered as
mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate disciplinary
action. Also, they may be considered in determining when the re-
spondent has the capacity to assist in the preparation of his case.
The court determined that an appropriate disciplinary action would
serve the purposes of punishment to the individual, deterrence to
others, and restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the
legal profession.. In this instance, an annulment of the respondent's
license to practice law was deemed appropriate.
Susan Robinson
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS v. WHITE, 349 S.E.2d 919 (W.
Va. 1986).
Commingling Funds - Burden of Proof
On a recommendation for disbarment by the West Virginia State
Bar's Committee on Legal Ethics, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals addressed the following issues: (1) Whether the committee
met its burden of proving the charges; and (2) whether the procure-
ment of a loan for a third party with a client's funds and commingling
the funds held as a co-trustee with an attorney's own funds violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The court, in discussing the first issue, recognized that conflicts
in testimony existed, but affirmed its position that recommendations
made by the Committee are to be given substantial consideration
absent a mistake of law or arbitrary assessment of the fact. Thus,
the court held that the Committee met its burden of proving the
charges against the attorney by "full, preponderating and clear ev-
idence."
The court further ruled that an attorney who procures a loan
without disclosing all of the relevant facts, misrepresents the nature
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of transactions, and further co-mingles money which he held as co-
trustee with his own is subject to disciplinary action.
For consideration in mitigating the disciplinary action recom-
mended, the attorney produced evidence of reimbursement. The court
recognized that in some instances reimbursement would be considered
to mitigate the disciplinary action. The facts of this case, however,
did not warrant mitigation. The attorney was disbarred.
Susan Robinson
-XIV. TAXATION
MORGANTOWN v. WEST VIRGINIA BD. OFREGENTS, 354
S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 198.7).
Amusement Tax
On an appeal from the City of Morgantown from a circuit court
declaratory judgment that the Board of Regents is not required to
collect an amusement tax for events sponsored by West Virginia Uni-
versity, the Supreme Court of Appeals .held that, as the -events are
not conducted for private benefit, they cannot be taxed.
The court held that such events are-part of the education provided
by the state university with the profits collected from them going to
the benefit of a public institution. "There is no individual person,
company, or interest that stands to profit from university sponsored
events. . . ." The court thus rejected the city's position that since
the funds generated go into accounts separate from the Board of
Regents general revenue fund, since the state collects a consumer sales
tax on ticket sales, and since the funds are not used in direct support
of the university function, they should be treated as private for the
purposes of taxation.
Bruce Stanley
IN RE 1975 TAX ASSESSMENTS AGAINST ONEIDA COAL CO.,
360 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1987).
In -reversing a circuit court decision that reduced the valuation
assessed by the Webster County Assessor -and upheld by the county
commission, the West Virginia -Supreme Court .of Appeals held that
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the evidence of lower valuations for surrounding properties is insuf-
ficient to have an assessment declared constitutionally unequal and
nonuniform. Rather, the party contesting the higher assessment must
show that the assessor's lower valuation of surrounding properties
was "intentional and systematic."
Citing precedent, the court held that while a showing of unequal
assessments is not proof of intentional and systematic undervaluation,
the complaining taxpayer can take his complaint to the county com-
mission, sitting as the Board of Equalization and Review, to have
the valuation of surrounding property raised. The complaining tax-
payer will not, however, have its assessment lowered as long as the
property has been valued at market value.
Bruce Stanley
CALHO UN COUNTY A SSESSOR V. CONSOLIDA TED GA S
SUPPLY, 358 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1987).
Assessment Procedure Statutes
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the county
assessor can require utility companies holding oil and gas leases from
third parties to provide information about those properties. The court
held that while taxation statutes are construed against the government,
assessment procedure statutes are construed in favor of the govern-
ment and that the lease between the utility and the property owner
is of a sufficient "representative or possessory character" to require
the utility to provide the name of the property owner and "other
reasonable information" so long as the assessor's inquiry is reason-
able.
Bruce Stanley
ASHLAND OIL v. ROSE, 350 S.E. 2d 531 (W.Va. 1986).
B & 0 Taxes
In light of a 1984 United States Supreme Court decision invali-
dating the West Virginia Business and Occupation Tax on wholesale
sales by out-of-state manufacturers, the question facing the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals was whether to apply the higher
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court's decision in a retroactive manner. Prior to the Court's decision
in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, which struck down the
West Virginia tax as an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce, Ashland Oil contested a deficiency assessment by the West
Virginia Tax Commissioner. Upon the higher Court's ruling, Ashland
Oil was granted a summary judgment in circuit court. The state tax
commissioner appealed that judgment.
In concluding that the Court's decision in Armco, Inc. should be
applied prospectively rather than retroactively, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals, citing precedent, cited the following items:
(1) The substantive issue before the Supreme Court of the United
States was in a traditionally settled area of law (state taxation); (2)
the case involved substantive rather than procedural law; (3) the case
involved a statute, not common law; and (4) the Court's decision
was a "clear departure" from prior substantive law. The summary
judgment ruling was reversed and the case remanded.
Bruce Stanley
XV. TORTS
HUNTER v. JOHNSON, 359 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1987).
Negligence - Jury Instruction - Unavoidable Accident
The issue in this case was whether an unavoidable accident in-
struction should be given in a negligence case.
The court had previously regarded such an instruction with dis-
favor in negligence cases and considered it prejudicial error to charge
the jury on such a theory where negligence was supported by the
evidence. Further, such instruction was considered confusing and as
forestalling reasoned analysis of the negligence, foreseeability, and
proximate cause issues. Thus, the court held that an unavoidable ac-
cident instruction should not be given in a negligence case.
Susan Robinson
MILLER v. GIBSON, 355 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1987).
Third-Party Contribution - Employee - Mandolidis-Injury
1987]
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The issue entertained by the court in this case was whether an
employer is liable in contribution to a third party as a joint tortfeasor
in a tort action brought by an employee.
Following the Mandolidis standard, the court ruled that in an
action brought by his employee, an employer may be liable in con-
tribution to a third party as a joint tortfeasor only if the employer
is guilty of wilful, wanton and reckless misconduct which proximately
caused the injury or death of the employee.
Susan Robinson
COVEY v. FIELDS, 354 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1987).
False Arrest
This appeal involves an action against an individual for false arrest
and wrongful prosecution where the trial judge directed a verdict.
The issue presented to the court was whether the complaint stated a
claim against the defendant. The court concurred with the decision
of the trial court that the complaint failed to make out a prima facie
case of false arrest or wrongful prosecution. However, the court held
that allegations in the complaint that the defendant had in effect
threatened and used profanity and insulting words toward the plaintiff
causing him distress and humiliation stated a cause of action under
West Virginia's "'insulting words" statute (W. VA. CoDE § 55-7-2).
The court further ruled that plaintiff was not required to put on proof
of damages and that failure to do so does not support a directed
verdict.
Susan Robinson
JONES v. TRUSTEES OF BETHANY COLLEGE, 351 S.E.2d 183
(W. Va. 1986).
Statute of Limitations - Latent Injury Manifestation
The question presented to the court in this action was whether
the statute of limitations is tolled by the manifestations of a latent
injury.
The general .rule in West Virginia has been that the statute of
limitations begins to run in -an .action -for personal injuries on the
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date the injury is inflicted. In malpractice actions, where the plaintiff
may be unaware that injury has been inflicted, the court applies a
discovery rule. In considering whether a latent injury from a traumatic
event tolls the statute of limitations where a noticeable injury did in
fact occur, the court attempted to balance the rationales for the stat-
ute of limitations with plaintiff's interest. Noting that considerable
time elapses between the filing of a suit and the trial which should
enable the plaintiff to discover the full extent of his injuries, the court
held that the statute of limitations is not tolled by the discovery of
a latent injury resulting from a traumatic event when a noticeable
personal injury was sustained.
Susan Robinson
HICKMAN v. GROVES, 358 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1987).
Statute of Limitations - Product Liability Actions
On certified question from the Circuit Court of Wood County,
the court discussed the issue of when the statute of limitations begins
to run in products liability actions.
Prior to this case, the court held that the statute of limitations
in products liability actions accrues from the date of the injury. Not-
ing that the discovery rule had been adopted in medical and legal
malpractice actions, this court now extends the discovery rule to prod-
ucts liability actions. Further, the court determined that a plaintiff
has "discovered" the cause of action when he is aware or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should be aware: (1) That he has been
injured; (2) the identity of the maker of the product; and (3) that
the product had a causal relation to his injury.
The court declined to establish a further requirement that the
plaintiff know the product was defective as a result of the conduct
of its manufacturer, noting that this knowledge is often not estab-
lished until after the verdict.
The court also discussed whether a plaintiff may amend his com-
plaint to add a third-party defendant after the statute of limitations
has run. The court held that under Rule 15(a) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure, such an amendment would be granted where
19871
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the amended complaint was based on the same occurrence as the
original complaint and where no prejudice would result because the
third party was already actively defending the case.
Susan Robinson
WALKER v. WALKER, 350 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1986).
Wrongful Death
This is an appeal from a lower court decision which awarded the
entire proceeds of a wrongful death settlement to one of the dece-
dent's children, excluding all others. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals was required to determine whether the lower court erred
in not ordering an equitable distribution of the settlement among all
of the children.
Applying W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1986), the court held that
the trial judge has discretion in directing the distribution of the dam-
ages. Although lack of financial dependency on the deceased parent
does not preclude recovery, the court may consider loss of income
as a factor in apportioning the award. The loss of services, the close
relationship shared by the minor child and his father, and the de-
pendency of a child on the decedent are also legitimate criteria to be
considered in apportioning an award among eligible beneficiaries. The
evidence showed little or no relationship between the decedent and
his other children. Moreover, the only person who stood to benefit
from the income and services of his father, had he lived, was the
child who received the award. Based on these facts, the court found
no abuse of discretion by the lower court.
Susan Robinson
GILLESPIE v. ELKINS SOUTHERN BAPTIST CHURCH, 350
S.E.2d 715 (W. Va. 1986).
Wrongful Discharge
This case involved a suit filed by a pastor alleging wrongful dis-
charge and civil conspiracy against certain individuals. Directed ver-
dicts were entered in favor of the individuals on the conspiracy charge,
and a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the pastor on the wrongful
discharge claim.
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The court addressed the issues of: (1) Whether jurisdiction of civil
court is proper where the controversy surrounds the wrongful dis-
charge of a pastor; (2) whether the pastor had been wrongfully dis-
charged; and (3) whether a cross-assignment of error may be made
when an appeal of the entry of the directed verdict was not made
within the normal eight-month period.
Finding that the internal conflict resolution mechanisms of the
church structure had been exhausted and the right to be protected is
a property or contractual right, the court held that the trial court
had jurisdiction. The court noted that an action may arise when the
discharge is contrary to public policy or when it violates a promise
of job security. The court held that analysis of either of these theories
would require the courts to go beyond neutral principles of law, and
thus the court held that without some compelling reasons, its inquiry
would be limited to whether the church met and whether it acted to
terminate the pastor's services.
Furthermore, the pastor attempted to challenge the directed ver-
dict against the individuals on cross-assignment. The court held that
where the claims were based on distinct and unconnected grounds
and two different judgments were entered, the court was not required
to review the directed verdict under Rule 10(f) because the individuals
involved were not parties to this appeal.
Susan Robinson
XVI. WILLS AND ESTATES
SEIFERT v. SANDERS, 358 S.E.2d 775 (W. Va. 1987).
Life Estates
The primary issue addressed by the court in this case was whether
a joint and mutual will (1) devised the testator's real and personal
property in fee simple to the survivor, or (2) provided a life estate
in the real and personal property to the survivor. The court also
considered whether the power to dispose of the property was limited
to an inter vivos conveyance or whether it could properly be disposed
of by will. Further, the court addressed the question of whether the
holographic will in question was valid.
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The court held that when a joint and mutual will devises all real
and personal property to the survivor to take and hold as his sole
and entire property, the survivor receives a fee simple estate. This is
true even where the will provides for disposition of the property not
disposed of by the survivor.
The court further held that the absolute power of disposal includes
conveyance by will as well as by inter vivos conveyance. The court
reasoned that a holographic will is valid if it is wholly in the testator's
handwriting, is signed, and evidences testamentary intent. Testamen-
tary dispositions of property do not require exact wording. Thus, the
words "when I am done with the farm it is Harley's to take it and
do whatever is best [sic] to do," established this requirement.
Susan Robinson
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